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WHY LIBERALISM PERSISTS: THE 
NEGLECTED LIFE OF THE LAW IN THE 
STORY OF LIBERALISM’S DECLINE 
KENNETH L. TOWNSEND† 
I. INTRODUCTION
Liberalism is in decline in the West.  Past political divides that 
pitted classically liberal conservatives against moderate to pro-
gressive political liberals are giving way to a new landscape in 
which a liberal consensus simply cannot be assumed.  From the 
left, socialist and identity-based critiques of liberalism have called 
into question core liberal assumptions regarding procedural jus-
tice, the division between public and private realms, and the rights 
of individuals.1  From the right, an increasingly vocal group of 
conservatives is questioning classical liberalism’s commitment to 
limited government, a free market, and individual rights in favor 
of a vision of political community where the state advances certain 
religious, traditional, or nationalist views.2 
† Kenneth Townsend is Scholar in Residence at Wake Forest University School of 
Law and Director of Leadership and Character in the Professional Schools at Wake 
Forest University; B.A., Millsaps College; M.Phil, Oxford University; M.A., J.D., Yale 
University. The author would like to thank Ron Wright, Marie-Amelie George, Mark 
Hall, Andrew Verstein, Christine Coughlin, Carol Anderson, Mike Green, Ryan 
Rowberry, Michael Lamb, Ted Afield, Paul Lombardo, John Travis Marshall, Steven 
Kaminshine, Robert Weber, Russell Covey, and Jeff Vagle. 
1 See, e.g., Nancy Fraser, From Progressive Neoliberalism to Trump—and Beyond, 
AM. AFFS. (Nov. 2017), https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/11/progressive-
neoliberalism-trump-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/U3HK-Y295]; Francis Wade, “The 
Liberal Order Is the Incubator for Authoritarianism”: A Conversation with Pankaj 
Mishra, L.A. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 15, 2018), https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/the-
liberal-order-is-the-incubator-for-authoritarianism-a-conversation-with-pankaj-mishra/ 
[https://perma.cc/HQ4W-6L23]. 
2 See, e.g., PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED (2019); Sohrab Ahmari 
et al., Against the Dead Consensus, FIRST THINGS (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www 
.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2019/03/against-the-dead-consensus [https://perma.cc/ 
8SJ9-ZS52]; Adrian Vermeule, A Christian Strategy, FIRST THINGS (Nov. 2017), 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2017/11/a-christian-strategy [https://perma.cc/N4YA-
JWTP]. 
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Liberalism is in trouble then, but is it dying?3  The answer is 
yes, according to a number of recent critiques from the so-called 
“post-fusionist” right—a collection of thinkers who resist the “long 
‘fusion’ that has defined conservatism since the Reagan era, 
between social traditionalists and economic free-marketers.”4  No-
table among their ranks is Notre Dame political theorist Patrick 
Deneen, whose postmortem of liberalism, Why Liberalism Failed, 
has captured the energies and anxieties of the age in a manner 
rare for a work in legal or political theory.5   
“Liberalism has failed,” according to Deneen, in characteris-
tically dramatic fashion,  
not because it fell short, but because it was true to itself.  It has 
failed because it has succeeded.  As liberalism has “become more 
fully itself,” as its inner logic has become more evident and its 
self-contradictions manifest, it has generated pathologies that 
are at once deformations of its claims yet realizations of liberal 
ideology.6   
 
3 See Zack Beauchamp, The Anti-Liberal Moment, VOX (Sept. 9, 2019, 8:20 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/9/9/20750160/liberalism-trump-putin-
socialism-reactionary [https://perma.cc/X7ZX-KX7N] (offering a helpful primer on the 
subject of liberalism’s fate). 
4 Benjamin Wallace-Wells, David French, Sohrab Ahmari, and the Battle for the 
Future of Conservatism, NEW YORKER (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.newyorker 
.com/news/the-political-scene/david-french-sohrab-ahmari-and-the-battle-for-the-future-
of-conservatism [https://perma.cc/6XLM-K9BT]. 
5 See generally DENEEN, supra note 2. Originally published in 2018 and reprinted 
in paperback with a new preface in 2019, the book has garnered significant 
attention—even making President Obama’s recommended books list of 2018—and has 
been reviewed in at least sixty publications, ranging from Foreign Affairs to First 
Things, the National Review to the New York Times. See Mariana Alfaro, Obama Says 
These Were His 29 Favorite Books of 2018, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 28, 2018, 3:34 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/barack-obama-books-2018-12 [https://perma.cc/AR2Y-
7FE6]; Christian Alejandro Gonzalez, We Still Need Liberalism, NAT’L REV. (June 22, 
2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/06/book-review-why-liberalism-
failed-patrick-deneen/ [https://perma.cc/NUG9-4Q84]; G. John Ikenberry, Why Liber-
alism Failed, FOREIGN AFFS., May–June 2018, at 191 (book review), https://www 
.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2018-04-16/why-liberalism-failed [https:// 
perma.cc/2G33-UY9X]; Peter J. Leithart, Deneen Among the Liberals, FIRST THINGS 
(Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2018/11/deneen-among-
the-liberals [https://perma.cc/GR4U-U6A2]; Jennifer Szalai, If Liberalism Is Dead, 
What Comes Next?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/ 
17/books/review-why-liberalism-failed-patrick-deneen.html [https://perma.cc/6WYN-
9FY4].  
6 DENEEN, supra note 2, at 3. 
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Deneen insists these “deformations” are reflected both in the right’s 
liberalism of individualism, as well as in the left’s liberalism of 
diversity.7   
Chief among liberalism’s “pathologies” is the “false turn it 
made in its imposition of an ideological remaking of the world in 
the image of a false anthropology.”8  At an individual level, this 
“false anthropology” conceives of “increasingly separate, autono-
mous, nonrelational selves replete with rights and defined by our 
liberty, but insecure, powerless, afraid, and alone.”9 
At an institutional level, the “false anthropology” of the indi-
vidual has coincided with and produced a form of legalism that has 
supplanted custom and abandoned virtue and the common good in 
favor of private interest.10  As the unity of church and state, reli-
gion and politics, and law and meaning, has been “disassembl[ed]”11 
by a liberalism that privatizes meaning and reinterprets liberty as 
the absence of any constraints rather than the realization of one’s 
purposes, law, in turn, has come to be understood as that which 
facilitates one’s unrestricted movement rather than as a tool for 
realizing one’s purpose in the context of the relationships and 
communities that provide meaning to one’s life.12 
According to this critique, liberalism’s law replaces natural 
and traditional social connections with artificial and procedural 
relationships, producing, perversely, “a lawlessness” that “claims 
to value ‘rule of law’ as it hollow[s] out every social norm and 
custom in favor of legal codes.”13  Rather than conceiving law as an 
 
7 Id. at 3, 17–18. “Conservatives and progressives alike have advanced liberal-
ism’s project, and neither as constituted today can provide the new way forward that 
must be discerned outside our rutted path.” Id. at 19. 
8 Id. at 3, 19. 
9 Id. at 16, 19.  
10 Id. at 83. 
11 Id. at 27. 
12 Id. at 38.  
[T]he more completely the sphere of autonomy is secured, the more compre-
hensive the state must become. Liberty, so defined, requires liberation from 
all forms of associations and relationships, from family to church, from 
schools to village and community, that exerted control over behavior through 
informal and habituated expectations and norms. These controls were large-
ly cultural, not political—law was less extensive and existed largely as a 
continuation of cultural norms, the informal expectations of behavior learned 
through family, church, and community. With the liberation of individuals 
from these associations, there is more need to regulate behavior through the 
imposition of positive law. 
Id. 
13 Id. at 82.  
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extension of custom and as a tool for cultivating virtue and com-
mending the common good, liberalism decouples law from mean-
ing or purpose, and from character or virtue.14  The more that 
human relationships are regulated by this “bad man” theory of 
law, the weaker natural, organic ties between individuals and 
each other and their communities.15  As a result, the law of liberal-
ism—what Deneen calls “legalism”16—is left with nothing to do or 
say with respect to personal virtue or the common good.  “Delinked 
from any conception of ‘completion’—telos or flourishing—and 
disassociated from norms of natural law, legalism results in a 
widespread effort to pursue desires as fully as possible while 
minimally observing any legal prohibition.”17 
According to Deneen, then, the problems facing liberal socie-
ties, the United States in particular, are twofold: (1) liberalism has 
created a conception of the person whereby meaning-making in 
traditional, natural (private) loci is undermined, while (2) also 
leaving little, if any, space for considerations of the common good 
or meaning-making in the public sphere.18  As a result, liberal 
citizens are alienated, and liberal societies are listless.19   
Americans are, according to these critiques, literally—but not 
meaningfully—free.20  We have the right, but not the capacity, to 
 
14 Id. at xiii–xiv. According to Deenen, before liberalism, liberty and self-rule were 
“achieved not primarily by promulgated law—though law had its place—but through 
extensive social norms in the form of custom. This was so much the case that Thomas 
Aquinas regarded custom as a form of law, and often superior to formalized law, 
having the benefit of long-standing consent.” Id. at xiii. 
15 Id. at 38. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE PATH OF THE LAW (1897), in 
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 171 (1920) (“If you want to know the law and nothing 
else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences 
which such knowledge enables him to predict.”). 
16 Id. at 82–83. 
17 Id.  
18 Id. at 38.  
19 Much of this critique so far will sound somewhat familiar to those who have 
followed communitarian and so-called “new traditionalist” critiques of liberal democ-
racy. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: 
AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER 
VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (Bloomsbury Acad., 3d ed. 2013) (1981). 
20 DENEEN, supra note 2, at 38. Deneen is channeling the sort of distinction Isaiah 
Berlin made between “positive” and “negative” liberty as well as Benjamin Constant’s 
distinction between “liberty of the ancients” and “liberty of the moderns.” See, e.g., 
ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958), reprinted in THE PROPER STUDY 
OF MANKIND 191, 202–04 (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., Farrar, Straus & 
Giroux 2000) (1997); BENJAMIN CONSTANT, THE LIBERTY OF ANCIENTS COMPARED 
WITH THAT OF MODERNS (1816), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/constant-the-liberty-
of-ancients-compared-with-that-of-moderns-1819 [https://perma.cc/R8F8-94XW]. 
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self-govern.21  Meaning is increasingly elusive in the natural rela-
tionships of family, faith, and community; but the public realm 
provides little—if any—basis for promoting virtue or inspiring a 
commitment to the common good.  We consume, but are never sated.  
We are surrounded by others, yet alone.   
Liberalism, in other words, has been one big bait-and-switch. 
Using Deneen—as both a conversation partner and point of 
entry to the post-fusionist critique of liberalism—this Article 
demonstrates that the practices of liberalism, in law especially, are 
much less vulnerable to the post-fusionist critique than the 
theories of liberalism that Deneen and others target.  Reminding 
ourselves of the meaning-making capacities and the functions of 
law better enables those invested in the future of the liberal 
order—whether students, law teachers, legal professionals, or 
simply citizens—to defend the institutions that order our world. 
From American constitutional structure to contemporary cor-
porate law, I argue that law supports meaning-making, virtue, 
and the common good in two primary ways.  First, by securing the 
conditions for the exercise of individual conscience and associa-
tional autonomy in what we often consider the private sphere, the 
law of liberalism enables individuals and communities to develop, 
pursue, and share their most deeply held values, and to cultivate 
the associated virtues in a context of mutual support and shared 
meaning-making.  Second, by supporting norms and adopting poli-
cies that guarantee equal citizenship in the public realm, the law 
of liberalism recognizes the values of solidarity and equality in 
pointing toward a vision of the common good realized in the public 
realm.  I conclude by calling legal educators and lawyers to recog-
nize our responsibility in acknowledging and recovering law’s role 
in making meaning, cultivating virtue, and supporting the 
common good.  
II.  POST-FUSIONISM: SITUATING THE CRITIQUE 
Until recently, conservatives in America were reliable liber-
als.22  They accepted a fundamental commitment to the rule of law, 
acknowledged a separation between public and private spheres 
and a consequent limitation on the power and role of government, 
 
21 See generally Alexander Tsesis, Self-Government and the Declaration of 
Independence, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 693 (2012). 
22 Laura K. Field, Meet the Reocons, NISKANEN CTR. (Feb. 20, 2020), 
https://www.niskanencenter.org/meet-the-reocons/ [https://perma.cc/3KK7-SWTF]. 
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and generally viewed individual rights and individual autonomy 
as chief objects of concern.23  Even most traditionalist and religious 
conservatives, for whom certain liberal values never quite fit, 
made a bargain of sorts whereby they consented to classically 
liberal arrangements, as long as the laws of the land provided 
maximum freedom in the private sphere and perhaps a modicum 
of influence in public life.24 
But this conservative consensus surrounding liberal values is 
now fraying.  Post-fusionists have not only criticized liberalism of 
the left, which is to be expected, but have also taken direct aim at 
the very core of liberalism as historically theorized and practiced 
by the political right in the United States.25  Consider the following 
examples from 2019. 
In March 2019, the prominent Catholic magazine First Things 
published “Against the Dead Consensus,” a missive signed by fif-
teen prominent conservative thinkers that rejected pre-Trumpian 
“[c]onsensus conservatism” on the grounds that it was nothing 
more than a rights-based, free-market form of liberalism charac-
terized by the “fetishizing of [individual] autonomy.”26  In addition 
to expected references to the “transcendent dignity of the human 
person” and the “soulless society of individual affluence,” the 
authors proclaimed, among other things, that they “stand with the 
American citizen,” “want a country that works for workers,” and 
“believe home matters.”27  Such calls are recognizably conservative, 
in a way, but a far cry from the classically liberal conservatism 
that has been so influential in American politics at least since the 
1960s.  
In May 2019, Sohrab Ahmari, the op-ed editor of the New York 
Post and one of the signatories of “Against the Dead Consensus” 
penned a follow-up piece, also in First Things, in which he clarified 
and personified the target of “Against the Dead Consensus.”  In 
 
23 Kay C. James, Defining the Principles of Conservatism, HERITAGE FOUND. 
(Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.heritage.org/conservatism/commentary/defining-the-
principles-conservatism [https://perma.cc/CDE3-D7GJ]. 
24 This past “consensus” or “fusion” is exactly the sort of compromise that 
animates the current ire of post-fusionists. Compromised fusionists include the 
mainstream of the Republican Party and have been the rule, rather than the 
exception, in the conservative movement, according to post-fusionists. 
25 See, e.g., Field, supra note 22; Nick Burns, The New Intellectuals of the 
American Right, NEW STATESMAN (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.newstatesman.com/ 
world/north-america/2020/04/new-intellectuals-american-right [https://perma.cc/9URN-
8QZZ]. 
26 Ahmari et al., supra note 2. 
27 Id. 
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“Against David French-ism,” Ahmari points to the “nice”ness of 
French, a constitutional lawyer, as emblematic of a “persuasion or 
a sensibility” among certain conservatives who mistakenly believe 
that liberalism’s rule of law remains the best way to advance 
conservative causes.28  Ahmari rejects what he considers French’s 
naïve respect for the rule of law.29  He cites drag queen story hours 
for children at public libraries as definitive proof that the old tools 
of combat have failed conservatives in their fight against an 
increasingly assertive and pernicious liberalism.30   
In July 2019, the newly established Edmund Burke 
Foundation organized a “National Conservatism” conference in 
recognition, and celebration, of declining support for the “rules-
based liberal order” that once held sway among the American 
conservative movement.31  The conference, according to its conven-
ers, was designed to “recover and reconsolidate the rich tradition 
of national conservative thought.”32  According to the conservative 
National Review, the conference outlined a sort of “intellectual 
Trumpism” for a conservative movement that is less solicitous of 
the values shared by consensus conservativism regarding the rule 
of law, limited government, and individual rights.33 
In the face of these and other denouncements of liberalism and 
its law, the legal academy has been somewhat slow to articulate a 
 




30 Id.; for French’s initial written response to Ahmari, see David French, What 
Sohrab Ahmari Gets Wrong, NAT’L REV. (May 30, 2019, 6:22 PM), https://www 
.nationalreview.com/2019/05/david-french-response-sohrab-ahmari/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2RMR-2VZ2]. Throughout the summer and fall of 2019, conservative publications and 
venues discussed the merits of Ahmari’s broadside against French. The two even faced 
off in multiple head-to-head debates at Catholic universities around the nation. 
Following the debate at Notre Dame, a student publication wrote, “French criticized 
‘academic political theorists’ who can get ‘divorced from the real world.’ . . . He prizes 
the practical approach: [French states,] ‘I’m not liberalism conceived, I’m liberalism 
applied. That’s what a lawyer does.’ ” Bea Cuasay, The Ahmari-French Debate at Notre 
Dame, IRISH ROVER (Sept. 26, 2019), https://irishrover.net/2019/09/the-ahmari-
french-debate-at-notre-dame/ [https://perma.cc/DJ45-6754]. 
31 A Conference in Washington, D.C., July 14–16, 2019: About, NAT’L CONSERVA-
TISM, https://nationalconservatism.org/natcon-dc-2019/about [https://perma.cc/4WTE-
79YH] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
32 Id. 
33 Jimmy Quinn, At the National Conservatism Conference, an “Intellectual 
Trumpist” Movement Begins To Take Shape, NAT’L REV. (July 18, 2019, 6:30 AM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/07/national-conservatism-conference-intellectual-
trumpist-movement/ [https://perma.cc/L78J-KWA3]. 
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defense of law’s capacity to respond to threats to the liberal order.  
Even the one law journal that published a symposium issue 
entitled The Travails of Liberal Democracy in late 2019 took only 
partial advantage of the opportunity to feature voices defending 
law’s role in responding to foundational critiques of liberal 
democracy.34  Most of the symposium’s articles were authored by 
philosophers, rather than lawyers, and only one addressed the 
theoretical frontal assault on liberalism that is the focus of this 
Article.35 
The reasons for this oversight in the academy are explicable, 
even if ultimately misguided.  As a practical matter, most of the 
recent post-fusionist discourse regarding liberalism’s decline has 
taken place in venues infrequently visited by legal academics, such 
as the pages of quasi-intellectual conservative and religious 
publications and the debating stages of Catholic universities.  
Furthermore, lawyers are often instinctively reluctant to consider 
law’s role in making meaning or pursuing virtue.  Such consid-
erations, it might be assumed, smack of Sunday School or a 
philosophy seminar and seem ill-suited to the grounded and 
procedural work of law.  Those interested in the survival of liber-
alism, either on the political right or left, must be prepared to 
engage the concepts of purpose, virtue, and the common good that 
animate critiques of liberalism as well as the contexts in which 
those critiques are leveled. 
As the author of the most complete post-fusionist critique of 
liberalism so far, Patrick Deneen provides a natural conversation 
partner for this Article.  Deneen is neither a lawyer nor a legal 
academic; despite this, he garners attention from the legal aca-
demy—although not as much as he probably deserves given his 
influence among popular audiences and adjacent disciplines.36  
Harvard Law Professor Adrian Vermeule, a member of the post-
fusionist camp and the leading legal theorist of so-called “Catholic 
integralism,”37 has called Why Liberalism Failed a “masterpiece” 
 
34 See 2019 Editors’ Symposium: The Travails of Liberal Democracy, 56 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 853 (2019). 
35 See Micah Schwartzman & Jocelyn Wilson, The Unreasonableness of Catholic 
Integralism, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1039, 1043 (2019). 
36 About, PATRICK J. DENEEN, https://www.patrickjdeneen.com/about [https:// 
perma.cc/Q8QS-S2Y2] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
37 Catholic integralism refers to the Catholic political doctrine whereby the 
separation of church and state is abolished and Catholic principles are “integrated” 
into the laws governing society in a comprehensive way. It envisions the ultimate 
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and a “triumph,”38 a commendation which reflects the potentially 
radical implications of Deneen’s thought.  Vermeule’s only critique 
of Deneen is that his proposed ending, which involves a sort of 
“Benedict Option”39 whereby communities of virtue remove them-
selves from the dominant and dying liberal society, seems 
incongruous with Deneen’s diagnosis of the problem.  Vermuele 
proposes an alternative ending, “a kind of . . . fan fiction” in which 
“rather than retreating to a nostalgic localism, nonliberal actors 
strategically locate themselves within liberal institutions and 
work to undo the liberalism of the state from within.”40 
Yale Law Professor Samuel Moyn has also offered a somewhat 
mixed review of Deneen, but for different reasons, praising 
Deneen’s compelling critique of liberalism insofar as it applies to 
libertarian liberalism or neoliberalism.41  Moyn pushes back, how-
ever, on Deneen’s generalizations regarding liberalism’s inevitable 
decline and insists “that remedies are possible within modern 
liberalism to bring out its virtues and contain its vices.”42  Moyn 
further identifies the “real task” as “an ideological rescue mission 
and an institutional reform,” and insists that  
[t]he challenge is locating the right institutions, whether inher-
ited from the past or invented afresh.  But it is much better to 
face this challenge than to follow Deneen and Dreher in ruefully 
counseling people to drop out, or reactionaries like Vermeule in 
insisting on a full-blown replacement of liberal institutions with 
an “integralist” order.43 
Moyn is right to insist that “fac[ing] this challenge” and 
addressing the crisis of faith in liberalism requires “locating the 
 
replacement of the institutions of liberal democracy with those of the Catholic Church. 
See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 2. 
38 Adrian Vermeule, Integration from Within, AM. AFFS. (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2018/02/integration-from-within/ [https://perma.cc/ 
BFB8-75SB] (reviewing PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED (2018)). 
39 ROD DREHER, THE BENEDICT OPTION: A STRATEGY FOR CHRISTIANS IN A POST-
CHRISTIAN NATION 2 (2017). 
40 Vermeule, supra note 38. Vermeule has recently elaborated on his dissatisfac-
tion with fellow conservatives and advocated for a “common-good constitutionalism” 
rooted in his theory of integralism. Adrian Vermeule, Beyond Originalism, ATLANTIC 
(Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/common-good-
constitutionalism/609037/ [https://perma.cc/U4VY-DNYN].  
41 Samuel Moyn, Neoliberalism, Not Liberalism, Has Failed: A Response to Pat-
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right institutions,”44 but neither Moyn nor anyone else has fully 
considered the ways that law, as an institution and as a practice, 
tells a different story about liberalism than the decline narrative, 
which is so focused on the supposed emptiness of liberalism in all 
its forms.  The reading of liberalism that Deneen and fellow post-
fusionists advance is ultimately both too theoretical and too 
inevitable.  Liberalism in a form serviceable to those on the politi-
cal left and the political right remains alive in part because its 
logic is not inexorable.  Theory is transmitted, in fits and starts, 
but always imperfectly, through the legal and political institutions 
of the community.  Deneen’s understanding of that institutional 
mediation is incomplete and, as a result, he and fellow critics are 
more pessimistic about the viability of liberalism than is war-
ranted. 
Liberalism is not in perfect health, but to assess its future, or 
to defend its existence, the legal academy must look beyond theory 
on the one hand and putative cultural decline on the other to 
examine the concrete institutions and practices that order liberal 
societies.  Using Deneen as my interlocutor, this Article demon-
strates that narratives of liberalism’s decline have overlooked and 
misunderstood the role and relevance of law and will draw upon 
legal norms, practices, and institutions—including legal education 
and the legal profession itself—in elaborating upon Moyn’s obser-
vation “that remedies are possible within modern liberalism to 
bring out its virtues and contain its vices.”45 
III.  UNITY, DIVERSITY, AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 
A. Founding Constraints46 
American law’s capacity to support meaning-making, 
cultivate virtue, and promote the common good is rooted in the 
history and structure of the Constitution.47  In his narrative of 
inevitable decline, however, Deneen too quickly projects various 
undesirable features of modern life onto the American founding 
and onto James Madison, in particular.48  Deneen notes at the out-
set of Why Liberalism Failed that “we should rightly wonder 
whether America is not in the early days of its eternal life but 
 
44 Id.  
45 Id. 
46 DENEEN, supra note 2, at 161. 
47 Id. at 162–65. 
48 Id. at 101.  
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rather approaching the end of the natural cycle of corruption and 
decay that limits the lifespan of all human creations.”49  He later 
spends almost an entire chapter tracing the role of the American 
founding in liberalism’s failure.50 
Deneen claims that James Madison’s liberal conception of the 
person at once compromised the viability of communities and 
associations where meaning-making typically occurs, and simulta-
neously empowered the national government to take on new, and 
unjustified, power to itself.51  Furthermore, according to Deneen, 
Madison’s celebration of “diversity” undermined the ability of 
citizens to find any common vision of the public good or a shared 
understanding of the virtues necessary for self-government.52  As 
a result, the American founding serves as both a cautionary tale 
and representative example of liberalism’s failures.53 
Deneen further argues that the American experiment has 
been doomed because the “Constitution is the embodiment of a set 
of modern principles that sought to overturn ancient teachings and 
shape a distinctly different modern human.”54  He directs his ire, 
in particular, at the false promise of “pluralism” and the dangers 
of fragmentation.55 
According to James Madison in Federalist 10, the first object of 
government is the protection of “the diversity in the faculties of 
men” . . . .  Government exists to protect the greatest possible 
sphere of individual liberty, and it does so by encouraging the 
pursuit of self-interest among both the citizenry and public ser-
vants.  “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition”: powers 
must be separate and divided powers to prevent any one person 
from centralizing and seizing power . . . .56 
Prioritizing “diversity in the faculties of men” and creating an 
“enlarged orbit” of interests were meant to “inculcate civic indif-
ference and privatism among the citizenry,” according to Deneen.57 
Madison hoped one consequence of enlarging the orbit would be 
heightened levels of mutual distrust among a citizenry inclined 
 
49 Id. at 4.  
50 Id. at 161–78. 
51 Id. at 170. 
52 Id. at 163–64.  
53 See id. at 165–66. 
54 Id. at 101.  
55 Id. at 102–03.  
56 Id. at 101.  
57 Id. at 163–64.  
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to advance particular interests, rendering them less likely to 
combine and communicate . . . . 
It was Madison’s hope that once the populace recognized its 
relative powerlessness in the public realm, the people would 
instead focus their attention on achievable private aims and 
ends.58 
The result, according to Deneen, is a republic that is 
constitutively incapable of maintaining itself.59  “The system’s 
architects intended to encourage a focus on private concerns 
among the citizenry—a res idiotica that they called a ‘republic,’ ” 
but “a republic cannot survive in the absence of ‘public things.’  
The belief that liberalism could achieve modus vivendi by encour-
aging privatism has culminated in the nearly complete disassoci-
ation of the governing class and a citizenry without a cives.”60  In 
other words, Deneen argues, the dual process of privatizing 
purpose while conceiving meaning as nothing more than self-
interest has eroded any viable conception of citizenship or the 
public good.61 
Deneen also criticizes the Founders for adopting a republic—
or, as Deneen says, a res idiotica—rather than a democracy, on the 
grounds that the Founders, like liberalism more generally, only 
feigned interest in the will of the people and erected systems 
insulated from the will and whims of the people.62   
[B]oth classical and progressive liberals are dominated by 
thinkers who praise the rule of the electorate even as they seek 
to promote systemic governmental features that will minimize 
electoral influence in the name of good policy outcomes. . . .  The 
authors and defenders of the Constitution argued on behalf of the 
basic law by explicitly rejecting the notion that the Constitution 
would result in a democracy.63 
It is not only a bit anachronistic for Deneen to suggest the 
Founders were insufficiently concerned with democracy—given 
that the new Constitution, its limitations notwithstanding, was 
the most democratic of its age—but especially ironic that Deneen 
 
58 Id. at 164–65.  
59 Id. at 165–66. 
60 Id. at 9.  
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 166. 
63 Id. at 162.  
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levels this charge only one page after he criticizes the “presentism” 
of liberals.64 
In this and other ways, Deneen fundamentally misunder-
stands the context and purpose of The Federalist Papers, the 
backgrounds of its authors, and the distinctly American iteration 
of liberal, and republican, political theory the documents reflect.  
The Federalist Papers are sometimes said to represent American 
political theory at its best,65 not because they are the most 
theoretically rigorous or even consistent texts, but rather because 
they embody American philosophical and political pragmatism, 
which has tended to adopt a more inductive approach to political 
argumentation than the deductive, first-principles method 
common in liberal political theory.66 
The Founders acted in a particular context with particular 
objectives in mind.  The Articles of Confederation, under which the 
states had operated from 1781 to 1787, had failed to provide a 
mechanism for coordinating the distinct interests of the original 
states, and as the nation grew and prepared to expand, the 
challenge of instituting a structure for a successful, large republic 
took on increasing salience.67  The Federalist Papers, therefore, 
must be understood as persuasive political tracts and analyzed for 
their rhetorical, persuasive appeal as much as, if not more than, 
any theoretical principles they reflect.  The Founders, including 
the authors of The Federalist Papers, were lawyers, statesmen, 
and rhetoricians and only incidentally, if at all, political theorists 
in the traditional sense of the term.68 
Deneen’s misunderstanding of the Founders’ context and pur-
pose leads him to misinterpret key elements of the founding, 
including the relationship between structure, theory, and virtue, 
and the role of each in the future of the republic. 
 
64 Id. at 161–62. 
65 As Thomas Jefferson noted, “[d]escending from theory to practice, there can be 
no better book than the Federalist.” GOTTFRIED DIETZE, THE FEDERALIST: A CLASSIC 
ON FEDERALISM AND FREE GOVERNMENT 25 (paperback reprt. 1999). And as James 
Madison observed, “[t]heoretical reasoning . . . must be qualified by the lessons of 
practice,” and also “that the Philadelphia Convention ‘must have been compelled to 
sacrifice theoretical propriety to the force of extraneous considerations.’ ” Id. (second 
alteration in original). 
66 See, e.g., Robert G. McCloskey, American Political Thought and the Study of 
Politics, 51 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 115, 115–16 (1957). 
67 DIETZE, supra note 65, at 25. 
68 Cf. id. at 30 n.48 (explaining how the Founders were statesmen in addition to 
theorists). 
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Deneen seems to interpret the founding through the lens of 
contemporary American culture and assumes a direct causal link 
between theoretical commitments of the Founders and various 
negative outcomes experienced in twenty-first-century American 
life.69  This interpretive move is unwarranted.  To blame Madison’s 
theory of the state for social fragmentation, the decline of virtue, 
and a loss of public-spiritedness assumes a logical inevitability be-
tween theoretical principles and social outcomes that simply does 
not follow.  In so doing, Deneen falls prey to the same critique he 
levels against liberalism regarding its universalizing logic of 
inevitability.70   
B. E Pluribus Unum 
While the Founders certainly took precautions to protect “di-
versity in the faculties of men,”71 they also valued unity, a 
combination perhaps most clearly reflected in that original 
national motto of the nation: E pluribus unum, “out of many, 
one.”72  The sentiment behind this motto, of course, manifested in 
the constitutional structure where a federal system divided power 
between national and state governments and also facilitated 
national unity among states with diverse interests and histories.  
Consider also the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, which, 
along with the rest of the Bill of Rights were adopted as part of a 
compromise between the Federalists who supported the 1787 
Constitution and the Anti-Federalists who feared it gave too much 
power to the new national government.73  The Free Exercise Clause 
recognizes, and protects, the many against a national government 
that might focus on the unum to the detriment of the pluribus.74  
The Establishment Clause, however, reflects the Nation’s early 
 
69 DENEEN, supra note 2, at 1–3. 
70 Id. at 3 (“Liberalism has failed—not because it fell short, but because it was 
true to itself. It has failed because it has succeeded. As liberalism has ‘become more 
fully itself,’ as its inner logic has become more evident and its self-contradictions 
manifest, it has generated pathologies that are at once deformations of its claims yet 
realizations of liberal ideology.”). 
71 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 73 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
72 22 J. CONT’L CONG., 1774–1789, at 338, 339 (1782) (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1914); 
71 CONG. REC. 918 (1929). 
73 Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 
1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 322–23. 
74 William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as 
Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545, 561 (1983). 
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commitment to unity amidst the diversity.  By forbidding the es-
tablishment of religion, the Founders signaled their concern that 
the public, the unum, not be captured by particular religious 
viewpoints. 
By protecting diversity and ensuring religious liberty, while 
also working toward a common basis for public life, the Founders 
appealed, implicitly and likely subconsciously, to multiple bases 
for legitimacy: a neutralist, non-coercion-based legitimacy as well 
as an expressivist conception of legitimacy.  The neutralist theory 
of legitimacy was given its fullest expression by twentieth-century 
political theorist John Rawls but is rooted in the philosophy of 
Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant.75  For a legal-political 
system to be legitimate and “stab[le] for the right reasons,”76 laws 
must be based on reasons that all reasonable citizens can accept, 
which, in turn, imposes restrictions on the sorts of reasons that 
are legitimately included in public deliberation, especially on 
“constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.”77  The Es-
tablishment Clause points, albeit inchoately, to this theory of 
legitimacy by gesturing toward a public realm that is not captured 
by, or beholden to, particular religious influences.78   
Expressivist theories of legitimacy, on the other hand, prior-
itize citizen engagement and expression as much as, if not more 
than, the content of the deliberation or the reasons invoked.  This 
theory of legitimacy is traceable to Hegel’s critique of Kant’s theory 
of legal and political community79 and has been influential in 
various critiques of Rawlsian public reason.80  Where Kant empha-
sized the role of reason in securing a stable and predictable 
conception of law, Hegel drew attention to law’s dynamic features 
 
75 IMMANUEL KANT, On the Relationship of Theory to Practice in Political Right, 
in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 73, 79 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2d ed. 1991) (“For if the law is such that a whole people could not possibly 
agree to it . . . , it is unjust; but if it is at least possible that a people could agree to it, 
it is our duty to consider the law as just . . . .”). 
76 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 459 (expanded ed. 2005). 
77 Id. at 442. 
78 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
79 See, e.g., G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, §§ 183, 260, 267, 274 (T.M. 
Knox trans., 1942) (1821). Hegel is often regarded as one of the most difficult of all 
German philosophers to read. For an excellent and eminently readable overview of 
Hegel’s expressivist critique of Kantian social contractarianism, see JEFFREY STOUT, 
DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION 77–85 (2004).  
80 See Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach, Rawls, Hegel, and Communitarianism, 19 POL. 
THEORY 539, 541 (1991). 
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and capacity.81  The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, again 
only inchoately, anticipates an expressivist theory of legitimacy by 
gesturing toward a dynamic, pluralist conception of the public 
realm where diverse viewpoints are welcomed. 
There is, of course, no authoritative “liberal” view regarding 
the relationship between the state and private associations within 
a liberal society, but the nation’s original motto reflects the 
Founders’ recognition that citizens have dual, and potentially 
conflicting, obligations, what Stanford Law professor Michael 
McConnell has called “citizenship ambiguity.”82 
For one category of liberals—let us call them the separation-
ists—religion and state could be, and generally should be, kept 
separate.83  Religion, according to the separationists, concerns in-
dividual belief more than action, and primarily implicates the 
private realm.  Therefore, religion should present few problems for 
the administration of public matters.  This view is most frequently 
associated with John Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration, in 
which he outlined a theory of religion focused on its internal 
features, voluntariness, and the absence of conflict between 
religious belief and political obligation.84 
By this we see what difference there is between the Church and 
the Commonwealth.  Whatsoever is lawful in the Commonwealth, 
cannot be prohibited by the Magistrate in the Church.  What-
soever is permitted unto any of his Subjects for their ordinary 
use, neither can nor ought to be forbidden by him to any Sect of 
People for their religious Uses.85 
To put church-state controversies in the context of the nation’s 
motto, the separationists assume the pluribus, churches, religious 
dissenters, and “diversity in the faculties of men,”86 can be given 
maximum liberty without undermining the integrity or identity of 
the unum, the state, the common good, and the public sphere.87  
While strict separationism need not inevitably result in the decline 
 
81 See sources cited supra note 79. 
82 Michael W. McConnell, Believers as Equal Citizens, in OBLIGATIONS OF 
CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST 
DEMOCRACIES 90, 92 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000). McConnell’s “Believers as 
Equal Citizens” has deeply shaped the argument of this entire section. 
83 Id. at 93. 
84 See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (William Popple trans., 
London, Awnsham Churchill 1689). 
85 Id. at 33. 
86 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 71. 
87 Neal Devins & Benjamin Feder, Reading the Establishment Clause, 
COMMONWEAL, Sept. 20, 1985, at 492, 492. 
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or marginalization of religion, this is part of Deneen’s critique of 
liberalism in general, and of the American founding in partic-
ular.88  Conceiving religion as private, domesticated, and easily 
bracketed reflects and perpetuates a fragmented conception of the 
person whereby things of ultimate meaning are relegated to the 
private realm and consequently diminished, which in turn hollows 
out the institutions and associations themselves—thereby render-
ing them less worthy of protection and less able to facilitate the 
formation of meaning and the pursuit of constitutive ends.89   
For another category of liberals, let us call them the civic 
totalists, religion was not so easily dismissed.90  Drawing upon 
classical conceptions of a unified society, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
for example, understood the powerful role of religion, including its 
power to shape public life.91  He favored state control of religion in 
service to the state—the pluribus in service of the unum—and 
proposed a civic religion that was designed and controlled by the 
state and was to be deployed to solidify individuals’ commitments 
to the civic order.92  Individuals, according to Rousseau, were born 
free but often failed to recognize their freedom because of social 
conventions, the “preference[s]” of their “particular wills,” and the 
indoctrination of so-called “partial societies.”93  For Rousseau, 
promoting identification with the “general will” and banning the 
“partial societies” had the advantage of removing a layer of 
intermediary institutions that frequently interfered with the 
individuals’ realization of true freedom and genuine equality.94 
What does all this have to do with Deneen?  Deneen projects 
both the separationism of Locke and the civic totalism of Rousseau 
onto his interpretation of Madison and the United States Consti-
tution and then groups all together under the generally derisive 
tag of “liberalism.”95  This conflation, however, is unwarranted.  
Madison recognized more clearly than separationists like Locke 
 
88 DENEEN, supra note 2, at 34. 
89 See id. at 9.  
90 Michael P. Bobic, Accommodationism and Religion, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPE-
DIA (2017), https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/825/accommodationism-
and-religion [https://perma.cc/L68Q-T5JK].  
91 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762), reprinted in 
ROUSSEAU: THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS 39, 148 
(Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans., 1997). 
92 Id. at 150–51. 
93 Id. at 60–62 (“It is important, then, that in order to have the general will 
expressed well, there be no partial society in the State . . . .”). 
94 Id. 
95 DENEEN, supra note 2, at 36–37. 
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the inevitable tension between the pluribus of religion and the 
unum of state.96  Madison followed Rousseau in appreciating the 
important role of religion, including its implications for public life, 
but he rejected Rousseau’s civic totalism whereby religion 
primarily operated in service to the state.97  Madison’s aims, to be 
sure, were not simply to “disassemble . . . irrational religious and 
social norms.”98  Rather, he sought to implement a constitutional 
structure that could account for this inevitable tension and, to the 
extent possible, provide accommodations for religious diversity 
and “diversity in the faculties of men,” without losing sight of the 
project for national unity.99  
Deneen also misunderstands, and underestimates, Madison’s 
interest in virtue and the common good.  The mere fact that 
Madison was especially interested in the role of structure to 
produce good outcomes, or at least prevent bad outcomes, did not 
mean that Madison was uninterested in virtue.  Informed by his 
early Calvinist influences and education, Madison insisted that 
structure, including law, and virtue complemented each other.100  
As he argued in Federalist 57: 
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first 
to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and 
most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society, and in the 
next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping 
them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.  The 
elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of 
republican government.  The means relied on in this form of gov-
ernment for preventing their degeneracy are numerous and 
various.101 
 
96 A recognition reflected most clearly in the text and history of the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment. 
97 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 71. Following the adoption of the Constitution and 
Bill of Rights, Madison continued to defend the sort of “partial societies” that Rous-
seau rejected. Madison, for example, acted as a leading advocate of the Democratic-
Republican civic associations that formed during and after the Whiskey Rebellion of 
1794. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, Democratic-Republican Societies, Subversion, and 
the Limits of Legitimate Political Dissent in the Early Republic, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1525, 
1532–33 (2004); John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 
565, 577–81 (2010).  
98 DENEEN, supra note 2, at 24. 
99 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 71. 
100 See, e.g., Leonard R. Sorenson, Madison on Sympathy, Virtue, and Ambition in 
the Federalist Papers, 27 POLITY 431, 432–34 (1995). 
101 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 71, at 348 (James Madison). 
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While neither the Founders nor the 1787 Constitution was 
perfect, the approach taken by the Founders reflects and has 
helped perpetuate a central truth regarding the maintenance of a 
liberal republic: virtues of humility and conviction are important 
on their own and in tandem, and even perhaps in tension, with 
each other.  From a system-level perspective, the state must be 
designed in such a way as to promote with conviction shared 
values, but those efforts must always be tempered by a recognition 
of pluribus and the limits of the state’s power or competencies.  
These virtues of humility and conviction are useful for individuals 
as well.  Citizens who feel a sense of conviction regarding the value 
of their system, while also recognizing the limits of their own 
knowledge and values, are most equipped to undertake the sort of 
public deliberation that liberal democracy requires. 
IV.  LAW AND MEANING: LEGISLATIVE 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
The post-fusionist critique of liberalism is ultimately a story 
about disenchantment and the loss of meaning.  Human beings are 
purposive and social creatures, according to Deneen, and liberal-
ism, as theorized on the right and left, systematically separates 
the self from the things that provide meaning, purpose, and 
belonging.102  “[L]iberalism teaches a people to hedge commitments 
and adopt flexible relationships and bonds.  Not only are all polit-
ical and economic relationships seen as fungible and subject to 
constant redefinition, so are all relationships—to place, to neigh-
borhood, to nation, to family, and to religion.  Liberalism encour-
ages loose connections.”103  
In its quest for universally applicable principles of justice, 
liberal theory has often resorted to thin, caricatured views of 
personhood, separated from history and located in a state of nature 
or behind a “veil of ignorance.”104  “Individuals, liberated and 
displaced from particular histories and practices, are rendered 
fungible within a political-economic system that requires univer-
sally replaceable parts.”105  Separated from history and unable to 
forge a vision for the future or a common conception of the good, 
liberal societies, Deneen insists, struggle to engage, much less 
 
102 DENEEN, supra note 2, at 34.  
103 Id. 
104 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118–23 (6th prtg. 2003). 
105 DENEEN, supra note 2, at 82. 
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facilitate, meaning-making.106  “In this world, gratitude to the past 
and obligations to the future are replaced by a nearly universal 
pursuit of immediate gratification . . . .”107 
The story Deneen tells is a compelling one in certain respects, 
but less so when the critique is focused on liberal practices rather 
than liberal theory.  In this Section, I catalogue various ways in 
which American law recognizes human beings as embedded 
creatures who seek meaning and recognition in community.  I out-
line some ways that law enables individuals to realize their 
constitutive ends and facilitates the formation of robust communal 
memberships, even on some occasions when communal norms 
challenge liberal values and in contexts ranging from constitutional 
to corporate law.  In addition to providing impersonal, procedural 
norms for regulating behavior, law signals values, embodies 
commitments, promotes particular visions of the good, and teaches 
citizens what citizenship in a liberal democracy entails. 
Law supports meaning-making in two primary ways.  First, by 
securing the conditions for the exercise of individual conscience 
and associational autonomy, in what we often consider the private 
sphere, the law of liberalism enables individuals and communities 
to develop, pursue, and share their most deeply held values and to 
cultivate the associated virtues in a context of mutual support and 
shared meaning-making.  Second, by supporting norms and adopt-
ing policies that guarantee equal citizenship in the public realm, 
the law of liberalism recognizes the values of solidarity and 
equality in pointing toward a vision of the common good realized 
in the public realm.  Recall our nation’s original motto, discussed 
above.  The pluribus charge of that motto aims to take seriously 
the “diversity in the faculties of men,”108 while the unum points 
towards that which we share in common as citizens. 
It is not simply the structure of American constitutional law 
that supports shared meaning-making, however.  Recent legisla-
tive and constitutional developments reflect law’s capacity to 
enable meaning-making, facilitate virtue, and promote the 
common good. 
 
106 Id. at 29–30, 34. 
107 Id. at 39.  
108 Id. at 163 (quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note 71). 
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A. Conscience and Community 
Deneen claims that the individualism of liberalism alienates 
individuals from their communities and sources of meaning, which 
leaves them only able to find meaning through the state:109   
Shorn of the deepest ties to family (nuclear as well as extended), 
place, community, region, religion, and culture, and deeply 
shaped to believe that these forms of associations are limits upon 
their autonomy, deracinated humans seek belonging and self-
definition through the only legitimate form of organization re-
maining available to them: the state.110 
While this total dependence on the state might characterize a 
system organized on the basis of Rousseau’s civic totalism—one 
that dissolves so-called “partial societies” for the sake of realizing 
“true” freedom and equality via the state111—this is simply not the 
way American law works. 
It is of course too simple to draw a straight line from Madison 
to contemporary America or from Rousseau to contemporary 
France, but the two nations have consistently reflected distinctive 
visions of liberal community.  In his haste to lump various forms 
of liberalism together and dismiss them, Deneen misses this 
nuance.  
Forty years after the Founding, Alexis de Tocqueville, one of 
Deneen’s intellectual heroes, observed the powerful role civil 
associations had played in cultivating Americans’ capacity for self-
governance, in contrast to what he perceived as France’s depen-
dence on the state:112 
Americans [form] associations [for] entertainment[ ], to found . . . 
education[nal institutions], to build inns, to construct churches, 
to [distribute] books, [and] to . . . found hospitals, prisons, and 
schools . . . .  Wherever . . . [there is a] new undertaking . . . [in 
the place of] the government in France, . . . in the United States 
you will be sure to find an association.113 
Questions regarding the role and extent of the state as the 
mediator of citizens’ freedom continue to play out differently in 
 
109 Id. at 60–61. 
110 Id. at 60. 
111 ROUSSEAU, supra note 91, at 27. 
112 In his tour of America, Tocqueville observed Americans through participating 
in civil associations and found that “[f]eelings and opinions are recruited, the heart is 
enlarged, and the human mind is developed by no other means than by the reciprocal 
influence of men upon each other.” ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 983 (Henry Reeve trans., Floating Press 2009) (1840).  
113 Id. at 979. 
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French and American contexts.  Consider recent disputes regard-
ing religious dress.  France has generally conceived of the public 
in more aspirational terms and has been less inclined to tolerate 
departures from “French” norms, including, for example, wearing 
of the hijab in public contexts.114  Hijab bans in public contexts 
have typically been justified on the grounds that they reflect the 
internalization of inferiority by women who wear them and the 
public should avoid being complicit in such oppression.115  French 
laïcité is much more demanding than whatever form of secularism 
is facilitated by the Establishment Clause of the American Con-
stitution, which is counterbalanced by the right to religious free 
exercise.116   
Or consider the different ways the two nations treat nonprofit 
corporations.  The United States differs from France and just 
about every other nation in the way its tax laws view nonprofit 
corporations.117  Individuals and groups in the United States can 
easily form nonprofit corporations to advance an extraordinarily 
wide range of issues.  The 501(c)(3) charitable nonprofit corpo-
ration, which facilitates the advancement of religious, educational, 
charitable, scientific, literary, and other causes, is the most well-
known, but section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for 
thirty-three different types of nonprofit corporations, ranging from 
civil leagues and chambers of commerce to cemetery companies 
and credit unions.118  Formation of nonprofit corporations not only 
provides a mechanism for their creators to promote their values, 
along with fellow like-minded citizens, but also enables individual 
taxpayers to make tax-exempt donations to these organizations in 
order to advance their concerns and signal their values.119  While 
it is almost certainly more efficient for the state to provide social 
services directly, rather than allowing individuals to effectively 
decide where some of their tax dollars will be used, American 
norms and American tax law reflect a distinctly American 
commitment to the role and value of private associations.120  As 
Tocqueville noted, participation in these sorts of civic associations 
not only enables the development of various virtues necessary for 
 
114 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 82, at 100–02. 
115 Id. 
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117 See, e.g., Alyssa A. DiRusso, American Nonprofit Law in Comparative 
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democracy but also reflects the importance of communities in 
developing capacities for meaning-making and self-governance.121 
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment has histori-
cally reflected the Founders’ commitment to freedom of conscience 
as well as their recognition of the role of private, non-state asso-
ciations and communities in meaning-making.122  In the wake of 
Employment Division v. Smith, however, that constitutional 
protection has been weakened.123  Whereas under the previous 
Free Exercise Clause standards, burdens on religious free exercise 
had to be justified on the basis of a compelling state interest, such 
burdens are now presumptively valid if resulting from a law that 
is “generally applicable” and “religion-neutral.”124   
While this new interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause has 
substantively limited the religious liberty of certain populations,125 
the overall impact to religious liberty and associational autonomy 
has been less significant than some onlookers had predicted.126  In 
response to the unpopular Smith decision in 1990, Congress 
passed—by a simple voice vote in the House127 and by ninety-seven 
to three in the Senate128—the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA) that aimed to reinstate the previous compelling-state-
interest standard to Free Exercise case law.129  Although the 
Supreme Court of the United States ruled in City of Boerne v. 
Flores that Congress overstepped its authority in establishing 
 
121 Id. 
122 Vincent Phillip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and 
the Impossibility of Its Incorporation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 585, 616–17, 620–21 (2006). 
123 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885-86 (1990). 
124 Id. at 886 n.3. “Our conclusion that generally applicable, religion-neutral laws 
that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified 
by a compelling governmental interest is the only approach compatible with these 
precedents.” Id. 
125 Burdens to religious liberty arising from state, not federal, action and that are 
not easily recast in the language of freedom of speech or expressive association are 
less protected following Smith. 
126 See, e.g., The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 1–2, 4, 7, 37–38, 47–48 (1992). 
127 H.R. REP. NO. 103-88 (1993). 
128 S. REP. NO. 103-111 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892. 
129 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997).  
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RFRA, as it applied to states,130 RFRA continues to apply to fed-
erally imposed burdens to religious liberty.131  In 1993, states also 
began to adopt their own RFRAs, resulting in a current total of 
twenty-one state-based RFRAs.132  Congress and states have stepped 
in to fill gaps as the Free Exercise Clause has lost its bite at the 
Supreme Court.   
Even as the Free Exercise Clause came to be interpreted less 
expansively by the Supreme Court, the Court has expanded its 
jurisprudence in other related areas, such as expressive associ-
ation.133  While not explicitly mentioned in the First Amendment, 
courts have determined that a right of expressive association is 
implied by, or derives from, other protected First Amendment 
rights, including free speech, free exercise, petition, and assem-
bly.134  In one of the foundational expressive association cases, the 
Supreme Court explained, “[T]he constitutional shelter afforded 
such relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw 
much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others.  
Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state inter-
ference therefore safeguards the ability independently to define 
one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty.”135  In a 
series of cases since, the Supreme Court and other lower courts 
have cited the right of expressive association in recognizing that 
the search for meaning, purpose, and identity are collective en-
deavors facilitated by the First Amendment.136 
These developments reveal not only the persistence of 
meaning-making institutions and communities but also the 
adaptability of American law to acknowledge and support the 
formation and maintenance of communities where virtue is 
developed and meaning is found. 
 
130 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519, superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, as recognized in 
Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015). 
131 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 423 
(2006). 
132 State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L. CONF. ON STATE LEGISLA-
TURES (May 4, 2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-
rfra-statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/X6FC-66LC]. 
133 See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972); Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835–37 (1995). 
134 See, e.g., Healy, 408 U.S. at 181. 
135 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984). 
136 See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835–37; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 
276 (1981); Healy, 408 U.S. at 181. 
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B. Solidarity and Equality 
Recall that Deneen believes liberalism has failed not only 
because of its inability to take seriously the traditional sources of 
meaning and loci of virtue but also because of its impoverished 
conception of the common good.137  Prior to the “Great Separation” 
of faith and politics and of law and meaning, premodern societies 
were characterized by a degree of unity that liberalism fore-
closes.138  Where premodern law worked hand-in-glove with the 
customs of a community and was informed by natural law, modern 
liberal law is disconnected from custom and is rooted in artificial, 
positive law.139  Deneen bemoans a modern liberal world charac-
terized by separation rather than unity and in which law regulates 
bad behavior but is not part of a holistic, integrated effort to 
cultivate individual virtue and promote the common good.140   
While Deneen is correct to note the development of the “bad 
man” theory of law that has coincided with, and been shaped by, 
the rise of liberalism,141 he is too quick to assume that liberal law 
lacks the ability to teach and form as well as to regulate or punish.  
Just because liberal societies tend to be especially solicitous of the 
meaning-making role of private associations and affiliations does 
not mean that liberal states can, or should, ignore law’s capacity 
for meaning-making and identity formation in the public sphere. 
Citizenship in a liberal republic requires the liberal state to 
recognize individuals as free and equal before the law.  The liberal 
state’s commitment to free and equal citizenship is a reflection of 
the society’s commitment to solidarity and equality and is meant 
to apply to all citizens irrespective of their particular backgrounds.  
Cathleen Kaveny, professor of law at Boston College, and former 
colleague of Deneen’s at Notre Dame, has offered “a nuanced view 
about how law can function as a moral teacher in a pluralistic 
society such as the United States, a view that is at once optimistic 
about the effectiveness of moral pedagogy without being utopian, 
and realistic about moral disagreement without being relativ-
istic.”142  This combination of dispositions is particularly useful in 
 
137 DENEEN, supra note 2, at 24–29. 
138 Id. at 38. 
139 Id. 
140 See id. at 38–40. 
141 Id. at 32. 
142 CATHLEEN KAVENY, LAW’S VIRTUES: FOSTERING AUTONOMY AND SOLIDARITY 
IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 2 (2012). 
482 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:457   
a liberal democracy where legitimacy requires some measure of 
consent and effectiveness. 
According to Kaveny, “If we look closely at the American legal 
system, we will find ample evidence of how law can still function 
as a powerful moral teacher by holding up a compelling, integrated 
vision of our common life that inspires people to move beyond its 
strict requirements.”143  In particular, she points to signature leg-
islative efforts such as the Civil Rights Act,144 the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA),145 and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA)146 as tangible reflections of the vision of American 
political community and the role of law in realizing that vision of 
solidarity.147  These legislative accomplishments “all adopt a nor-
mative and holistic attitude toward the function of law; in other 
words, each law gestures toward a vision of how the citizens of the 
United States should live their lives in common.”148  In particular, 
“each piece of legislation signals the hope that the subjects of the 
law will move beyond mere compliance with the external require-
ments of the law to appreciate the broader vision of community 
that it wishes to encourage.”149  The content of “that broader vision 
of community,” according to Kaveny, “exemplifies the fruitful rela-
tionship between autonomy and solidarity.”150   
Kaveny’s work calls to mind Robert Cover’s now-famous 
Nomos and Narrative, in which he argues that law performs both 
a “world-creating” as well as a “world[-]maintaining” function.151  
These functions map onto, respectively, law-as-meaning and law-
as-social-control and to two distinctive approaches to education: 
“paideic” and “imperial.”152  The paideic, or world-creating, ideal-
typical pattern aims to educate citizens into a normative system 
and involves “a sense of direction or growth that is constituted as 
the individual and his community work out the implications of 
their law.”153  The discourse that emerges from the paiedeic model 
is “initiatory, celebratory, expressive, and performative, rather 
 
143 Id. at 65. 
144 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
145 Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601. 
146 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101. 
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than critical and analytic.”154  In contrast, the imperial, or world-
maintaining, ideal-typical pattern, involves educating citizens 
about different values and systems, and in this model “norms are 
universal and enforced by institutions.”155  The discourse of this 
system is “premised on objectivity,” and “[i]nterpersonal commit-
ments are weak, premised only upon a minimalist obligation to 
refrain from . . . coercion and violence.”156 
Whether dealing with race, gender, or disability, the legis-
lative efforts that Kaveny describes reflect a conception of liberty 
that does not fit squarely with the negative view of liberty that 
Deneen associates with liberalism.  The Family and Medical Leave 
Act, which requires employers to provide unpaid family and 
medical leave in qualifying circumstances,157 and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, which prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of disability and imposes accessibility requirements on public 
accommodations,158 reflect a positive conception of liberty and a 
substantive, rather than merely formal, conception of equality.  
One who fears taking off work to care for a child or one whose 
disabilities prevent her wheelchair from accessing a potential 
place of employment is not unfree from the standpoint of negative 
liberty.  The problems that these pieces of legislation address deal 
not with tangible, state-sanctioned limits on the free movement of 
individuals but rather the capacity of individuals for self-
realization and full participation in the community. 
Similarly, the public accommodations and public facilities 
provisions of the Civil Rights Act were designed to remove the 
badges of inferiority that had marked Black Americans since the 
early days of the republic.159  Even if formal, state-based discrimi-
nation ended, the Civil Rights Act recognized that full, free, and 
equal citizenship could not be realized if a group of citizens were 
unable to take part in a wide range of social and economic 
activities.160 
Deneen seems to have an all-or-nothing understanding of law’s 
relationship to social norms and meaning-making.161  Either law 
is organically and inextricably bound up with a community’s 
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customs and aspirations, which seems to be his preference, or law 
is simply a matter of regulation and compliance.162  In the preface 
to his updated 2019 edition of Why Liberalism Failed, Deneen cites 
Thomas Aquinas for conceiving “custom as a form of law.”163  
Throughout the book, when speaking of liberal law, Deneen 
frames in terms of its role “disassembling” what has come 
before.164   
Where Deneen sees liberal law through the lens of compliance 
and views pluralism as a threat to common purpose, Kaveny 
shows that law reflects and shapes a community’s vision, and she 
does “not believe the moral, religious, and cultural pluralism that 
characterizes American society precludes the possibility for our 
law to function as an effective moral teacher.”165  Deneen is ham-
pered here in part by his lack of engagement with law in the 
context of the Protestant Reformation and its aftermath.  Early 
Christian understandings of law frequently conceived civil law as 
continuous with, and inseparable from, religious law, a view which 
persists among certain Catholic post-fusionists, the integralists 
most obviously.166  Martin Luther planted seeds for the separation 
of civil and religious realms, including the “bad man” theory of law 
that Deneen associates with liberalism.167  According to Luther, 
law was only necessary because of human sin,168 but, for John 
Calvin, law played an essential role not simply in punishing bad 
behavior but in teaching values and in molding character.169  These 
 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at xiii. 
164 Id. at 27. 
165 KAVENY, supra note 142, at 4. 
166 See Schwartzman & Wilson, supra note 35, at 1041. 
167 See MARTIN LUTHER, TEMPORAL AUTHORITY: TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE 
OBEYED (1523), reprinted in LUTHER: SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS 51, 56 (J.M. 
Porter ed., 2003); see also DENEEN, supra note 2, at 38. 
168 According to Luther, 
[i]f all the world were composed of real Christians, that is, true believers, 
there would be no need for . . . law. . . . [I]t is impossible that the temporal 
sword and law should find any work to do among Christians, since they do 
of their own accord much more than all laws and teachings can demand, just 
as Paul says in 1 Timothy 1 [:9], “The law is not laid down for the just but 
for the lawless.” 
LUTHER, supra note 167, at 54. 
169 Calvin wrote: 
For [law] is the best instrument for enabling [believers] daily to learn with 
greater truth and certainty what that will of the Lord is which they aspire to 
follow, and to confirm them in this knowledge . . . . Let none of us deem 
ourselves exempt from this necessity, for none have as yet attained to such 
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Protestant conceptions of civil society have deeply shaped the 
modern development of republicanism and liberalism, including 
the founding of the United States.170  American law certainly regu-
lates bad behavior, but it also facilitates solidarity by signaling 
which values merit the state’s imprimatur. 
C. Between (Private) Communities and (Public) Solidarity: 
Hard Cases 
Achieving solidarity in some of the ways Kaveny describes has 
admittedly come at a cost.  Employers have had to change cultures 
and expend additional resources to avoid discrimination and to 
accommodate employees with disabilities or those on leave to care 
for family.171  Private businesses no longer have the freedom to 
serve simply those whom they want to serve but are now forbidden 
from discriminating on the basis of race, among other things.172  
Mainstream American culture seems to have accepted, and 
embraced, these tradeoffs, however, and has come to see law—
whether we are fully conscious of it or not—as necessary for the 
fuller realization of our shared identity.  Yet it would be naïve to 
ignore the conceptual and practical tensions that arise when 
different, important values come into conflict, including conflicts 
between values associated with conscience and community and 
those associated with solidarity and equal treatment. 
Conflicts concerning fundamental values are typically taken 
up by the courts, but public understanding surrounding these 
types of cases is often hampered by various judicial norms.  Judges 
are neither philosophers nor theologians, and courts are neither 
college seminars nor Sunday schools.  Courts are bound by certain 
rules and norms, including staying within the bounds of the record 
of the case and issuing as narrow of a ruling as possible to resolve 
disputes.  While these norms are important, they can obscure the 
extent to which constitutional law often concerns the deep conflict 
of fundamental values, leaving non-lawyer onlookers a bit dis-
satisfied or confused.  
 
a degree of wisdom, as that they may not, by the daily instruction of the Law, 
advance to a purer knowledge of the Divine will. 
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1. Christian Legal Society v. Martinez 
Consider, for example, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,173 
in which the Supreme Court reviewed the applicability of 
nondiscrimination policies for religious groups in the university 
context.174  The Martinez litigation concerned whether the Chris-
tian Legal Society (CLS) at the University of California–Hastings 
Law School could discriminate in its membership selection on the 
basis of religion and sexual orientation and still maintain its 
affiliation with the law school.175  Hastings considered its nondis-
crimination policy a legitimate tool for preventing discrimination 
against gay and lesbian students and for promoting tolerance.176  
The Christian Legal Society claimed Hastings’s nondiscrimination 
policy unconstitutionally restricted its associational freedom by 
tying its eligibility for university recognition, including meeting 
space and an allocation of student activity fees, to its willingness 
to change its beliefs regarding human sexuality as well as its 
practices regarding group membership.177  In a decision that left 
somewhat unresolved the extent to which public universities can 
limit associational freedoms in limited public forum contexts, the 
Court upheld Hastings’s nondiscrimination policy, which required 
CLS either not to discriminate on the basis of religion or sexual 
orientation or forego university affiliation and the attendant 
benefits.178 
The obvious conflict in the case concerned the autonomy 
interests of a conservative religious student group against the full 
inclusion rights of gay students, but Justice Ginsburg’s majority 
opinion was careful not to frame the controversy as one about full 
and free citizenship or the vision of the political community.179  
Rather, Ginsburg emphasized the neutral design and application 
of the Hastings’s nondiscrimination policy,180 and she downplayed 
 
173 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 
(2010). 
174 Id. at 668.  
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 671. 
177 Id. at 673–74. 
178 Id. at 669. 
179 Id. at 667–98. 
180 Id. at 694–95 (“In contrast to Healy, Widmar, and Rosenberger, in which 
universities singled out organizations for disfavored treatment because of their points 
of view, Hastings’ all-comers requirement draws no distinction between groups based 
on their message or perspective. An all-comers condition on access to RSO[, Registered 
Student Organization,] status, in short, is textbook viewpoint neutral.”). 
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the aspirational qualities of the nondiscrimination policy.181  She 
minimized the harm done to CLS by the application of the policy,182 
and she only considered one version of the policy, which lent itself 
more easily to neutralist interpretations.183  Furthermore, Gins-
burg made clear it was not the Court’s role to assess the 
“advisability” of the public forum that Hastings has established, 
only the “permissibility.”184 
Ginsburg neither celebrated the nondiscrimination aspira-
tions of Hastings nor criticized what the concurring opinions 
considered the narrowness of CLS but instead praised the 
“textbook viewpoint neutral[ity]” of the Hastings policy.185  Since 
neutrality was Ginsburg’s focus, and since she determined the 
policy to have been designed and applied in a neutral way, Gins-
burg avoided having to discuss directly the particular burdens 
upon, or the rights of, the religious student group in the Martinez 
controversy.186  While this approach is perhaps technically suffi-
cient, it leaves skeptics and supporters alike dissatisfied in that it 
elides questions regarding the value and role of associations and 
religious communities, on the one hand, and the importance of 
inclusion and nondiscrimination on the other. 
One can almost hear Robert Cover shouting at the Court from 
the grave!  In the closing pages of Cover’s Nomos and Narrative,187 
he bemoans what he considered the Supreme Court’s cowardly 
ruling in Bob Jones University v. United States, in which the Court 
upheld the IRS’s removal of tax-exempt status for the university, 
 
181 The main evidence showing Ginsburg downplayed the aspirational qualities of 
the policy is the fact that she does not really acknowledge any aspirational features of 
the policy. See id. at 667–98. 
182 Id. at 673 (“If CLS instead chose to operate outside the RSO program, Hastings 
stated, the school ‘would be pleased to provide [CLS] the use of Hastings facilities for 
its meetings and activities.’ CLS would also have access to chalkboards and generally 
available campus bulletin boards to announce its events. In other words, Hastings 
would do nothing to suppress CLS’s endeavors, but neither would it lend RSO-level 
support for them.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
183 See id. at 675–78. 
184 Id. at 692 (“[T]he advisability of Hastings’ policy does not control its 
permissibility. Instead, we have repeatedly stressed that a State’s restriction on access 
to a limited public forum ‘need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable 
limitation.’ ” (citation omitted) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808 (1985)). 
185 Id. at 695. 
186 Id. at 667–703.  
187 Cover, supra note 151, at 60–68. 
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even though Bob Jones cited its religious beliefs as the basis for its 
racially discriminatory policies.188  According to Cover: 
The Court assumes a position that places nothing at risk and 
from which the Court makes no interpretive gesture at all, save 
the quintessential gesture to the jurisdictional canons: the state-
ment that an exercise of political authority was not 
unconstitutional.  The grand national travail against discrimina-
tion is given no normative status in the Court’s opinion, save that 
it means the IRS was not wrong. . . .  
. . . It is a case in which authority is vindicated without the 
expression of judicial commitment to principle that is embodied 
in constitutional decision.  In the impoverished commitment of 
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion, the constitutional question was 
not unnecessary, but the Court avoided it by simply throwing the 
claim of protected insularity to the mercy of public policy.  The 
insular communities deserved better—they deserved a constitu-
tional hedge against mere administration.  And the minority 
community deserved more—it deserved a constitutional commit-
ment to avoiding public subsidization of racism.189   
Cover goes on to acknowledge in a footnote that 
[s]uch a commitment would necessarily have invited a host of 
problems.  But that is as it should be.  The invasion of the nomos 
of the insular community ought to be based on more than the 
passing will of the state.  It ought to be grounded on an interpre-
tive commitment that is as fundamental as that of the insular 
community.190   
In other words, according to Cover, the liberal state must recognize 
that law is more than a mechanism for coordination or punish-
ment; it reflects and creates normative universes, and even insular 
communities seeking to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, 
or sexual orientation deserve to be told candidly what substantive 
vision of solidarity through law is the basis for limiting their 
associational autonomy.191   
2. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 
Consider, also, the much-celebrated and much-maligned 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., decision in which a Health and 
 
188 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 612 (1983) (Powell, J., 
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Human Services (HHS) regulation adopted under the Affordable 
Care Act imposed a “contraception mandate” on employers who 
have more than fifty employees.192  Hobby Lobby and other closely 
held corporations contested the HHS regulation on the grounds 
that it imposed a burden on the corporations’ sincerely held reli-
gious beliefs and thus violated RFRA.193  The petitioners objected, 
in particular, to being forced to cover four forms of contraception 
that they considered abortifacients and thus especially objection-
able.194  Hobby Lobby insisted that, as a closely held corporation 
that operates on the basis of religious values, it should be eligible 
for the same work-around that the HHS regulation provided for re-
ligious nonprofit corporations to be exempted from the mandate.195 
HHS argued, and the Third Circuit ruled, that Hobby Lobby 
could not bring a successful religious liberty claim under RFRA 
because it was a for-profit corporation.196  The Third Circuit 
explained, “General business corporations do not, separate and 
apart from the actions or belief systems of their individual owners 
or employees, exercise religion.  They do not pray, worship, observe 
sacraments or take other religiously-motivated actions separate 
and apart from the intention and direction of their individual 
actors.”197 
The majority opinion, written by Justice Alito, reversed the 
Third Circuit and upheld Hobby Lobby’s claim, citing both general 
corporation law as well as the particular features of the corpora-
tions at issue in the case.198  In Alito’s opinion, to deny Hobby 
Lobby’s claim under RFRA would be a form of unjust discrimi-
nation, effectively making it more expensive to be business owners 
who seek to live out their values through their work than to be 
 
192 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 692 (2014) (construing 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2018)). 
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195 Id. at 729–31. 
196 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
197 Id. (quoting Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1291 
(W.D. Okla. 2012), rev’d en banc, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013)). 
198 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 706–07 (“A corporation is simply a form of 
organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of 
law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, 
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is to protect the rights of these people.”). 
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business owners who simply want to make a profit.199  The record 
clearly revealed, according to Alito, business owners who sought 
to align their work with their values: 
Hobby Lobby’s statement of purpose commits the [plaintiffs] 
to “[h]onoring the Lord in all [they] do by operating the company 
in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.”  Each family 
member has signed a pledge to run the businesses in accordance 
with the family’s religious beliefs and to use the family assets to 
support Christian ministries.  In accordance with those commit-
ments, Hobby Lobby and Mardel stores close on Sundays, even 
though the [plaintiffs] calculate that they lose millions in sales 
annually by doing so.  The businesses refuse to engage in profit-
able transactions that facilitate or promote alcohol use; they 
contribute profits to Christian missionaries and ministries; and 
they buy hundreds of full-page newspaper ads inviting people to 
“know Jesus as Lord and Savior.”200 
Of particular relevance to the case, the plaintiffs “believe that life 
begins at conception and that it would violate their religion to 
facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or devices that operate 
after that point.”201 
Alito further noted that since “HHS concedes that nonprofit 
corporations can be protected by RFRA,” the “corporate form alone 
cannot provide the explanation” for refusing Hobby Lobby’s RFRA 
claim,202 especially since the division between for-profit and non-
profit corporations in the context of religious liberty claims is 
simply not “clear-cut.”203  Alito explained: 
Not all corporations that decline to organize as nonprofits do so 
in order to maximize profit.  For example, organizations with 
religious and charitable aims might organize as for-profit cor-
porations because of the potential advantages of that corporate 
form, such as the freedom to participate in lobbying for legisla-
tion or campaigning for political candidates who promote their 
religious or charitable goals.204   
“This argument,”205 “that RFRA does not protect for-profit 
corporations because the purpose of such corporations is simply to 
 
199 Id. at 706. 
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2020] WHY LIBERALISM PERSISTS 491 
make money,”206 Alito concluded, “flies in the face of modern cor-
porate law.”207  Pointing to the history and structure of corporation 
law, Alito determined: 
While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit 
corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not 
require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of 
everything else, and many do not do so.  For-profit corporations, 
with ownership approval, support a wide variety of charitable 
causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to 
further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives.208 
Alito went on to note recent developments in corporation law that 
have made it even easier for owners to integrate their values into 
their work:209   
In fact, recognizing the inherent compatibility between estab-
lishing a for-profit corporation and pursuing nonprofit goals, 
States have increasingly adopted laws formally recognizing 
hybrid corporate forms.  Over half of the States, for instance, now 
recognize the “benefit corporation,” a dual-purpose entity that 
seeks to achieve both a benefit for the public and a profit for its 
owners.210   
Thirty-six states, plus the District of Columbia, currently 
provide for the creation of benefit corporations, enabling their 
owners to advance and signal their values to external audiences 
while also conducting the more traditional activities associated 
with corporations.211 
Whether one views the outcome of Hobby Lobby favorably or 
unfavorably, it is hard to deny that the case concerned complicated 
questions of meaning, purpose, and identity and involved individ-
uals seeking to express their values and pursue their ends, not 
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What Hobby Lobby reveals, perhaps most clearly, is the per-
vasiveness of considerations of meaning and purpose in American 
law.  It is somewhat widely recognized that the Constitution 
creates and maintains contexts in which individuals can give voice 
to their deepest values;213 it is less widely recognized that even 
American corporate law’s history and structure provide individ-
uals who seek integrated lives some tools for realizing that 
integration.  And even though the form of that integration in 
Hobby Lobby took on a politically conservative valence, there is 
nothing, as a formal matter, that precludes closely held corpo-
rations from seeking integration for more liberal or progressive 
causes.  As Alito noted, “So long as its owners agree, a for-profit 
corporation may take costly pollution-control and energy-conser-
vation measures that go beyond what the law requires.  A for-
profit corporation that operates facilities in other countries may 
exceed the requirements of local law regarding working conditions 
and benefits.”214  Stated differently, corporate law in America 
affirmatively enables those who own closely held corporations to 
pursue their values through their work.215 
The question courts must ask when important values conflict 
is not whether to traffic in meaning, purpose, and identity, but in 
what way to do so.  Alito’s opinion made a strong, liberal, case for 
respecting the religious liberty rights of the petitioners so that 
they could integrate the personal and professional spheres of their 
lives, but it should not be forgotten that, on the other side, HHS 
articulated a compelling—even if not compelling enough for the 
majority—case for the interests of women.216  Similar to the 
motivation of legislative acts such as the ADA and FMLA, the 
HHS regulation was designed to effectuate the freedom of a 
frequently disadvantaged segment of the population: women.217  
By requiring employers to cover preventive health care plans—
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which typically cost more for women than for men—the ACA, in 
general, and the HHS regulation, in particular, aimed to fulfill the 
promise to women of full and equal citizenship.218 
While the conflicts between conscience and community, and 
between fairness and solidarity, can feel intractable, the conflicts 
themselves offer a clear reminder that law in the United States 
does not preclude the pursuit of meaning but rather it provides a 
mechanism for mediating different visions of meaning-making and 
the relationship between individuals, groups, and the state. 
V.  LIBERALISM’S PERSISTENCE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
A. Finding Agency in Uncertain Times 
I have suggested that the conclusions of Deneen and the post-
fusionists should be resisted for various reasons, among them 
(1) liberal practices, including law, should be distinguished from 
liberal theory; (2) liberal law reflects and facilitates meaning-
making, cultivation of virtue, and pursuit of the common good in 
ways that these critics overlook; and (3) because of the foregoing 
reasons, the story of the inevitable, or already complete, demise of 
liberalism is misguided. 
While Deneen overstates the inevitability of liberalism’s 
demise and overlooks ways the law of liberalism can guard against 
some of its deleterious effects, he is not completely wrong.  
Deneen’s critique has received such a warm welcome precisely 
because he has tapped into the popular anxieties of the age in a 
way that is rare for a book in legal and political theory.  My argu-
ment, then, is not a naïve one.  Liberal societies face serious 
problems.  Popular trust in liberal institutions, norms, and prac-
tices is low and declining.219  Leaders often seem incapable of, or 
uninterested in, offering a vision or a plan that interrupts the 
narratives of decline and distrust.220  Rising income inequality is 
hollowing out a middle class, leading many on the left and right to 
question whether liberalism’s free market is worth trying to 
save.221  And there is increasing evidence to demonstrate Amer-
icans lack the type of relationships—whether from family, church, 
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or even the local bowling league222—where meaning and purpose 
are cultivated. 
Though admittedly depressing, the evidence post-fusionists 
marshal to prove liberalism’s failure is still subject to interpre-
tation.  Will our great-grandchildren view the early twenty-first 
century as the moment when liberalism breathed its last gasps 
before being replaced by other legal and political orders?  Or will 
our great-grandchildren look back at our time as one that tested 
the durability, flexibility, and viability of liberalism, but from 
which liberalism emerged, perhaps even stronger?  We do not 
know.223  The Owl of Minerva only takes flight at dusk.224  I have 
attempted to argue, however, that although there are reasons for 
pessimism, there are also signs and sources of hope, often rooted 
in law, that critics like Deneen generally avoid or misunderstand. 
Not only is there a principled case to be made regarding 
liberalism’s capacity for survival, but there are also very practical 
aspects to consider when contemplating liberalism’s health and 
viability.  If liberalism has died—but whatever is to follow has not 
yet been born—where does that leave those of us who inhabit 
(formerly) liberal societies? 
If the demise of liberalism, the dominant sociopolitical legal 
system of our time, is inevitable, what are we to do?  And what will 
take liberalism’s place in a world where exposure to diverse ways 
of life—which helped prompt liberalism’s initial rise—is only 
increasing? 
Various critiques of Deneen have noted—and he has generally 
conceded225—that his plans and predictions for what follows 
liberalism are vague, at best, and his guidance no clearer for how 
citizens are to conduct themselves in this period of transition.226  
In an effort to empower disillusioned citizens, Deneen proposes a 
turn inward and away from public life,227 but it is far from clear 
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what the positive impact of that would be.  If anything, an inward 
turn could make the present divides in liberal societies even great-
er and the quest for the common good only more elusive. 
Rather than turning inward and giving up on liberalism and 
the prospect of seeking a common good amidst diversity, why not 
interpret the current moment as an opportunity to use our as-
sociations and institutions to address some of the deficiencies 
liberalism’s critics have identified?  The question seems especially 
relevant for those institutions and professions that have at various 
times and in various ways been caretakers of the public good.  In 
these final pages, I briefly outline some of the ways that legal 
education and the legal profession have contributed to the crisis of 
legitimacy facing liberalism’s law, and I begin to sketch a way 
forward. 
B. Law, Virtue, and the Public Good 
There is an all-too-familiar story of decline regarding the legal 
profession, a story in which lawyers were once statesmen who 
embodied virtues of integrity, justice, and courage but who have 
fallen prey to various social, market, and professional forces in 
recent generations.228 
Law students, according to this story of decline, still some-
times enroll in law school for seemingly noble reasons but find 
themselves subject to forces that seem largely out of their control 
and end up choosing career paths very different from what led 
them to law school in the first place.229  These students become 
lawyers who feel compelled to bracket their own values from their 
work and to set aside questions of meaning, purpose, and the 
common good in favor of a professional identity rooted primarily, 
if not exclusively, in zealous representation of one’s clients.230  All 
too often these lawyers go on to become unhappy, if not depressed, 
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addicted, or suicidal, all the while the profession itself loses what-
ever credibility it had with the public.231 
Legal education is often blamed for contributing to, if not 
creating, a lawyerly mindset that not only leads to various un-
healthy social and personal outcomes but that also embodies some 
of the worst features of liberalism, including the alienation of one’s 
self from one’s ends and a form of consumerist individualism that 
leaves little room for considerations of personal virtue or social 
good.232 
One response to the mounting evidence of the profession’s 
decline would be to conclude that law, like liberalism,  
has failed—not because it fell short, but because it was true to 
itself.  It has failed because it has succeeded.  As [law] has 
“become more fully itself,” as its inner logic has become more 
evident and its self-contradictions manifest, it has generated 
pathologies that are at once deformations of its claims yet 
realizations of [law’s] ideology.233 
But this conclusion, like Deneen’s regarding liberalism’s failure, 
fails to account for sources and resources internal to law that can 
be channeled to resist some of these less healthy trends and 
developments. 
It is well documented that law students often enroll in law 
school for reasons that seem to have very little to do with their jobs 
after graduation.234  This is not necessarily a problem, in and of 
itself, but it presently reflects the ways in which law students, and 
the law generally, often lack a clear telos.  As the profession has 
come to understand itself primarily in terms of service to clients, 
its self-understanding has increasingly focused on competence 
rather than character, and on serving clients rather than promot-
ing some vision of the public good—a vision that is admittedly 
elusive at times.  It is striking, for example, how little attention is 
paid to justice—as an individual virtue or as an orienting, 
collective vision—in legal education and in the profession.235  If law 
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students and lawyers are not constrained by or oriented toward 
justice, they will understand legal reform in incrementalistic 
terms, if at all, and will lack a sense of personal or professional 
agency in effecting social change.236  This incrementalistic, status-
quo conception of law works in tandem with a judicial-centric 
vision of legal education, what Robert Cover would call “world 
maintaining,”237 that conceives the work of the lawyer as con-
cerned primarily with making the “right” argument to a judge 
rather than using law, in concert with one’s fellow citizens, to 
establish, maintain, and pursue the community’s vision.238  Law 
creates as well as contains, but legal education typically focuses 
more on law’s role as a mechanism for social coordination rather 
than as a tool for social transformation or the realization of justice. 
One of the ever-present risks of law, as a discipline, is that its 
focus on neutrality will alienate it from the particularity that it 
must navigate.  Law must be impartial and impersonal, if it is to 
be fair, but, if it loses all cognizance of the human element in which 
it operates, it will risk losing its relevance and legitimacy in the 
eyes of those whom it serves.  The human element of law is of 
course taking on new salience with the rise of artificial intelligence 
and machine learning.239  Many of the tasks historically performed 
by entry-level associates are already being done by machines, and, 
if predictions are to be believed, even more law-related jobs will be 
taken over by robots in the coming years.240  This makes it all the 
more imperative that legal education take seriously virtues such 
as wisdom and justice in the training of future lawyers.  Legal 
education and the legal profession will increasingly be required to 
articulate a value proposition that extends beyond technical com-
petency and that implicates an ethical register. 
Four distinct but related charges emerge from these observa-
tions.  Law schools and the legal profession must: (1) engage both 
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individual and profession-wide questions of meaning and purpose 
more fully; (2) provide instruction in the skills needed to be an 
excellent lawyer but also the virtues and character traits required 
to be a successful and fulfilled lawyer who understands her re-
lationship to the broader public; (3) keep in mind Madison’s admo-
nition that “[j]ustice is the end of government”241 and that law is 
the chief instrument in realizing that end; and (4) recognize that 
lawyers have distinct opportunities and obligations to uphold the 
public good in a liberal democracy, including with respect to 
cultivating and modeling self-government. 
There are no doubt principled as well as practical reasons to 
be skeptical of these suggestions regarding legal education and the 
legal profession.  Some might argue, for example, that my admoni-
tions are naïve in that they fail to understand the social and 
market dynamics of contemporary legal practice.  Others might 
insist that this values-and-vision approach is not bad in and of 
itself, but that it belongs in a school of theology or philosophy 
rather than a school of law tasked with developing certain core 
competencies.  Focusing on these matters in law school would 
inevitably result in omitting other, essential instruction.  Others 
might insist that talk of values and vision presents not just 
logistical challenges but principled ones as well.  If law schools 
engage in the domain of virtues and values, do they not risk 
elevating some conceptions of the good and denigrating others?  If 
law orients students and practitioners toward some vision of the 
good, what about those who hold other visions?  Still others might 
simply ask if law school occurs too late in the lives of students to 
shape their values in any meaningful way. 
These critiques reflect the same sorts of sentiments expressed 
by liberals who fail to take seriously the types of concerns Deneen 
raises.  The fact is that legal education and the legal profession 
cannot avoid engaging questions of meaning, purpose, and identity 
any more easily than liberalism.  Law schools socialize students in 
deep and numerous ways whether or not law schools recognize 
that they are doing so.  The question is in what ways—not whether—
values will be engaged and character formed.  Furthermore, the 
wellbeing of lawyers, the profession, and the broader public de-
pends on institutional leaders who can channel the virtue of 
courage in responding to current pressures.  Liberalism’s persis-
tence is not inevitable, but it is possible if the institutions and 
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associations upon which the health of liberal democracy depends 
recognize and respond to changing needs. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
While Deneen and the post-fusionists are too quick to conclude 
that liberalism’s failure is inevitable, they are right to note that 
liberalism’s persistence is not foreordained.242  If liberalism is to 
persist, which I believe it can, it will not be because of an inevitable 
march of history but instead because of the dedicated efforts of 
individuals and groups from the political left and right who 
recognize the value of liberalism even while acknowledging its 
limitations.  I have argued that liberal practices, including law, 
should be distinguished from liberal theory; that liberal law 
reflects and facilitates meaning-making, cultivation of virtue, and 
pursuit of the common good in ways that Deneen and the post-
fusionists overlook; and that, as a result, the story of the 
inevitable—or already complete—death of liberalism is misguided.  
And I have briefly sketched what reform efforts might look like for 
legal education and the legal profession to perform the mediating 
functions required by institutions needed in the distinctive context 
of America’s liberal democracy.  Law and legal education are, of 
course, not the only institutions in need of engaging meaning, 
virtue, and the common good.  For liberalism to persist, various 
associations, institutions, and professions must acknowledge the 
dearth of trust in American society, especially towards insti-
tutions, and think creatively about implementing reforms that 
recognize broader social needs as well as the distinctive opportu-
nities those associations and institutions have for reorienting 
themselves in ways that will conduce to the benefit of those 
particular institutions as well as for the common good.  While 
liberalism’s diagnosis of bad health is not without conceptual, 
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